Bollitics The new leader of the Labour Party

[Demitri_C]

So, someone loaned him some money.

 

 

I dont understand your point, if you borrow money either from a bank or family friend/member  the person if succesful pays back interest to the bank or pays back the person in full (unless your a crook of course) so what is the issue here? if no-one borrows money from a bank then the banks would go bust

 

have you read richard bransons book? he is a perfect example of rags to riches

[MakemineVanilla]

To be honest I thought Klass owned Miliband there, That is a new low to be todl by someone like Mylenne Klass

 

She is right though most of that masion tax will be paid by people in London. People out of london have much bigger houses but because its outside london worth much less so how is that " a mansion tax" might as well re-name it a "london tax"

 

She was quite right.

 

Every government has spent more money every year since 1954 and is set to continue to do so, no matter who is in power.

 

The present government pretends to make cuts and the media conspires in the idea of austerity but in reality all the rhetoric about cuts is only about justifying increasing taxes, the most notable of which are the regressive taxes of VAT and inflation, which disproportionately hit the poor and those on fixed incomes.

 

So yes, it was right that it should be pointed out that politicians should find something else in their locker, rather than yet another tax.

[snowychap]

I dont understand your point...

My point is that people don't do things in isolation.

have you read richard bransons book? he is a perfect example of rags to riches

Rags?

The Stowe-educated son of a barrister and grandson of a judge Richard Branson?

I haven't read his book but if it gives the impression that he came from 'rags' then it sounds about as reliant on truth as an advert for one of his products.

[Richard]

Never heard inflation referred to as a tax before

[snowychap]

Isn't it traditional to show examples when making these sorts of claims ?

I'm sure you are right but I'd like to see the data and how it's reached

Here's a link to the recent paper (pdf) produced by bods at the LSE and IESR (I haven't read it - it was the one about which there were a number of recent news reports) which has the following as its conclusion:

8. Conclusions

Whether we have all been “in it together”, making equivalent sacrifices through the period of austerity, is a central question in understanding the record of the Coalition government. This paper examines in detail one aspect of this, the distributional impacts of the changes to benefits, tax credits, pensions and direct taxes between the systems in place in May 2010 and in 2014/15. We also look ahead to the longer-term effects of already announced changes and plans, such as the complete introduction of Universal Credit and changes to the ways benefits, pensions and tax brackets are changed (indexed) from year to year, modelling what effects these would have by 2019/20.

As we explain in detail, there are limitations to this analysis. We do not, for instance, look at indirect taxes in our main analysis. Nor do we adjust for the lack of representation of those with the very highest incomes in the survey on which our analysis is based. We therefore will tend to understate some of the gains to the top few per cent of the population from the cut in the top rate of income tax from 50 to 45 per cent (starting from a May 2010 base), and their losses from its increase from 40 per cent (if starting from a January 2010 base).

That said, it is clear that the changes did not lead to uniform changes in people’s incomes. Indeed, it is striking that the overall fiscal effect of the changes after May 2010 up to 2014/15 compared to a price-linked base system was neutral overall. In effect, the reductions in benefits and tax credits financed the cuts in taxes. Some groups were clear losers on average – including lone parent families, large families, children, and middle-aged people (at the age when many are parents). Others were gainers, including two-earner couples, and those in their 50s and early 60s. Londoners were, on average, less favourably affected than other parts of the country (as a result both of more of them having very high and very low incomes, and changes and limits on Housing Benefit and other benefits having more effects in the capital).

Looking at the population as a whole, the changes were regressive. Against a price-linked base, the poorest half lost (with the poorest groups losing most as a proportion of their incomes) and the top half gained, with the exception of most of the top 5 per cent but excluding the very top. This was the result of the combination of: changes to benefits and tax credits which made them less generous for the bottom and middle of the income distribution; changes to Council Tax and associated benefits from which those in the bottom half lost but the top half gained; changes to income tax (higher personal allowances) which meant the largest gains for those in the middle, but with some income tax increases for the top 5 per cent; and state pension changes (particularly the ‘triple lock’) which were most valuable as a proportion of incomes for the bottom half.

Because real earnings fell over the period, an earnings-linked base would have been less generous to households, so by comparison with that, households as a whole were better-off than they would have been. Those in the top half gained, but the bottom twentieth lost and the rest of the bottom half was left unaffected on average. Looked at this way, the results were again regressive, apart from the very top.

Other analysis, including that from the Treasury, also shows the tax and benefit changes as being regressive between the bottom of the distribution and middle of the top half (up to the seventh or eighth tenth of the distribution). However, that analysis also suggests that the top tenth has lost more proportionately than the bottom tenth. The analysis in this paper suggests that there are three important dimensions for decisions to be made in how to make such comparisons that lead to this kind of conclusion.

The first is how large an income group is lumped together at the top when making this kind of comparison. Most of those within the top tenth are not in fact affected by what has happened to income tax for those with incomes above £100,000. But the incomes of those right at the top are so large, that what happens to them dominates the averages shown for the top tenth as a whole. So for instance, against a price-linked base, the next-to-top twentieth of the distribution are not losers on average.

The second is, however, a matter of interpretation – essentially over whether the income tax changes announced in Labour’s March 2009 Budget, which took effect from the start of April 2010, are counted as part of the system inherited in May 2010 or not. If the 2014/15 system is compared with the system in place in January 2010 (when the top rate of tax was 40 per cent) then our analysis also suggests that the top twentieth lost as much from direct tax and benefit changes as the bottom twentieth, around 3 per cent of income in each case. It depends, therefore whether the Coalition is given ‘credit’ for deciding not to reverse Labour’s changes that were already in effect when they took office. If it is, the overall regressivity of the reforms is reversed right at the top. If it is not, while the top twentieth lose slightly, their proportionate loss remains smaller than for all of the income groups in the bottom half of the population.

The third is the very many analytical choices that have to be made when considering the effects across the income distribution; as we illustrate in section 6, these can have a major effect on conclusions. One choice is how to rank households: a set of reforms that benefit low income households will look more progressive if households are ordered by income before the effect of policy changes, than if households are ranked by their post-reform incomes (as these same households will then be positioned higher up the income distribution, and their gains will appear to be a smaller proportion of their incomes). Whether or not all households entitled to benefits are assumed to receive them also has an influence, both because households not taking up benefits will naturally be located near the bottom of the distribution, and because changes to the generosity of payments that people do not receive cannot change household incomes. Allowing for non-take up therefore usually reduces the scale of changes – whether positive or negative – for low income groups, relative to an analysis that assumes complete take-up.

Finally, we look ahead at whether changes that have already been announced or planned, such as fully introducing Universal Credit and changes to indexation agreed by the government, if carried through to 2019/20, would change this picture (compared to an earnings-linked base, as being most appropriate for comparisons over the long term). Overall, we find that they would intensify the distributional effects seen by 2014/15. This would include increases in the losses of lone parent and large families, children in general and of most of the bottom half of the income distribution. Notably, looking over the whole period from May 2010 to 2019/20 people aged over 65 in general, and those aged over 80 in particular would lose. This is because they would be losing from much lower indexation rates for other benefits and parts of the tax system which would outweigh their gains from the ‘triple lock’ on state pensions. With losses both for pensioners and for children, some of the narrowing of age-related income differences achieved by the previous government would be reversed.

There is one potentially striking exception to this, however. While all other income groups in the bottom half would be losers on average over the nine years as a whole, the bottom twentieth would be gainers on average as a result of some of them receiving the new Universal Credit who would not currently be receiving all of the benefits and tax credits which it replaces. This effect is driven by the assumptions we make regarding take-up behaviour through the transition to UC: that take up of any of the existing means-tested payments will lead to take up of UC. This in turn reflects one of the main motivations for consolidating several claims and payments into one. It remains to be seen whether, in practice, take-up of means-tested pay ments improves in this way if UC is fully implemented.

Again, this illustrates the need to distinguish between broad conclusions and the subtleties of how particular groups are affected by complex combinations of reforms.

Overall, the changes have been regressive, with greater proportionate sacrifices from those with lower than those with higher incomes. But within this picture there are important variations, such as the less favourable treatment of some of those at the top, or the more favourable treatment of some of those at the very bottom if Universal Credit is introduced as planned and has the intended effect on take-up.

[MakemineVanilla]

Never heard inflation referred to as a tax before

 

Milton Friedman famously called it 'taxation without legislation'.

 

The trouble is that the media do not tell the truth about inflation and always refer to it as if it arises by accident rather than by design.

 

What they should really say, when they are telling us how wages have fallen by 6%, in real terms, is that it is the result of government policy (Quantitative-easing).

[Demitri_C]

The Stowe-educated son of a barrister and grandson of a judge Richard Branson?

 

 

My grandad was a judge and thats had no impact in my life so you have lost me there im afraid snowy

 

I haven't read his book but if it gives the impression that he came from 'rags' then it sounds about as reliant on truth as an advert for one of his products.

 

 

I would recomend you read it snowy. In addition have a read of Peter Jones another person I admire, he built most of his fortune from studying and hard work. Some people have just "got it" and know how to get rich without relying on mummy and daddy

Edited November 19, 2014 by Demitri_C

[TrentVilla]

You can't describe Branson's story as being 'rag's to riches' and expect to have it taken seriously.

[CarewsEyebrowDesigner]

There is no such thing a self-made individual. We all rely on society.

[snowychap]

The Stowe-educated son of a barrister and grandson of a judge Richard Branson?

My grandad was a judge and thats had no impact in my life so you have lost me there im afraid snowy

You claimed he is a perfect example of rags to riches.

In order to be that, he would need to start off in the 'rags' category.

Branson's story may well be the tale of a successful entrepreneur (with a few exceptions along the way) but it's not rags to riches.

And he hasn't made his journey alone and without the help of others (both directly and indirectly).

Edited November 19, 2014 by snowychap

[Demitri_C]

You can't describe Branson's story as being 'rag's to riches' and expect to have it taken seriously.

 

Have you read his book trent? it certainly does sound like rags to riches from what i read

[TrentVilla]

 

You can't describe Branson's story as being 'rag's to riches' and expect to have it taken seriously.

 

Have you read his book trent? it certainly does sound like rags to riches from what i read

 

 

There is no need to read it to know it wasn't a rag's to riches story regardless of how well he has done for himself.

[chrisp65]

a very quick look, suggests he wasn't without 'background' - if a privileged background gives you nothing else, it can give you the self belief and understanding of what you can do and what opportunities are out there, regardless of whether anybody handed him seed money or a contacts book

 

lifted directly from wikipedia, the bastion of all things true ....

 

Early life[edit]

Branson was born in Blackheath, London,  to barrister Edward James Branson (1918 – 2011), andEve Branson (born 1924), a former ballet dancer and air hostess.^[] His grandfather, the Right Honourable Sir George Arthur Harwin Branson, was a judge of the High Court of Justice and a Privy Councillor.^[8] Branson was educated at Scaitcliffe School, a prep school in Berkshire Branson attended Stowe School, an independent school in Buckinghamshire until the age of sixteen.^[9] Branson has dyslexia and had poor academic performance as a student, and on his last day at school, his headmaster, Robert Drayson, told him he would either end up in prison or become a millionaire.^[9]

Branson's parents were supportive of his endeavors from an early age. When 15-year-old Richard decided to breed budgies and persuaded his father to build a huge aviary, his father built it. Branson's parents have been described as encouraging.^[10]

 

^{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Branson}

[Risso]

 

 

You can't describe Branson's story as being 'rag's to riches' and expect to have it taken seriously.

 

Have you read his book trent? it certainly does sound like rags to riches from what i read

 

 

There is no need to read it to know it wasn't a rag's to riches story regardless of how well he has done for himself.

 

 

The pedantry on here is getting ridiculous.  "Rags to riches" doesn't have to mean that he was a shoeless orphan who came from the workhouse to be a billionaire.  However rich Branson's parents were, he started his business by himself, and after failing to breed budgies, started a magazine and then a record shop with what off the top of my head was something like £300.  The point is that he didn't inherit a fortune or a successful family business; everything he has now is because he started his business from scratch.  And before the pedant brigade chirp up again, yes, I acknowledge that he probably used the country's roads and telephone system etc at some point.

[TrentVilla]

Most people would call that self made Risso and it isn't about being pedantic when something/someone is so miss represented as that. 

 

No really need for the "pedant brigade" bit mate.

 

Even for someone starting a business from scratch as he did, the wealth of their parents provides a safety net not afforded to others or can. The education (no matter how poorly they perform), contacts etc of their upbringing can also have an impact, as too can having an aviary built.

 

Being self made is one thing, rags to riches is something entirely different. 

[blandy]

....after failing to breed budgies...

I'm sure there's a cheep gag in there somewhere.

[Jon]

 

.  And before the pedant brigade chirp up again, yes, I acknowledge that he probably used the country's roads and telephone system etc at some point.

 

[Risso]

 

....after failing to breed budgies...

I'm sure there's a cheep gag in there somewhere.

 

 

Uh oh, you've done it now.

[blandy]

I knew I shouldn't have, but it was the trill of it I couldn't resist.

[tonyh29]

 

Isn't it traditional to show examples when making these sorts of claims ?

I'm sure you are right but I'd like to see the data and how it's reached

Here's a link to the recent paper (pdf) produced by bods at the LSE and IESR (I haven't read it - it was the one about which there were a number of recent news reports) which has the following as its conclusion:

8. Conclusions

Whether we have all been “in it together”, making equivalent sacrifices through the period of austerity, is a central question in understanding the record of the Coalition government. This paper examines in detail one aspect of this, the distributional impacts of the changes to benefits, tax credits, pensions and direct taxes between the systems in place in May 2010 and in 2014/15. We also look ahead to the longer-term effects of already announced changes and plans, such as the complete introduction of Universal Credit and changes to the ways benefits, pensions and tax brackets are changed (indexed) from year to year, modelling what effects these would have by 2019/20.

As we explain in detail, there are limitations to this analysis. We do not, for instance, look at indirect taxes in our main analysis. Nor do we adjust for the lack of representation of those with the very highest incomes in the survey on which our analysis is based. We therefore will tend to understate some of the gains to the top few per cent of the population from the cut in the top rate of income tax from 50 to 45 per cent (starting from a May 2010 base), and their losses from its increase from 40 per cent (if starting from a January 2010 base).

That said, it is clear that the changes did not lead to uniform changes in people’s incomes. Indeed, it is striking that the overall fiscal effect of the changes after May 2010 up to 2014/15 compared to a price-linked base system was neutral overall. In effect, the reductions in benefits and tax credits financed the cuts in taxes. Some groups were clear losers on average – including lone parent families, large families, children, and middle-aged people (at the age when many are parents). Others were gainers, including two-earner couples, and those in their 50s and early 60s. Londoners were, on average, less favourably affected than other parts of the country (as a result both of more of them having very high and very low incomes, and changes and limits on Housing Benefit and other benefits having more effects in the capital).

Looking at the population as a whole, the changes were regressive. Against a price-linked base, the poorest half lost (with the poorest groups losing most as a proportion of their incomes) and the top half gained, with the exception of most of the top 5 per cent but excluding the very top. This was the result of the combination of: changes to benefits and tax credits which made them less generous for the bottom and middle of the income distribution; changes to Council Tax and associated benefits from which those in the bottom half lost but the top half gained; changes to income tax (higher personal allowances) which meant the largest gains for those in the middle, but with some income tax increases for the top 5 per cent; and state pension changes (particularly the ‘triple lock’) which were most valuable as a proportion of incomes for the bottom half.

Because real earnings fell over the period, an earnings-linked base would have been less generous to households, so by comparison with that, households as a whole were better-off than they would have been. Those in the top half gained, but the bottom twentieth lost and the rest of the bottom half was left unaffected on average. Looked at this way, the results were again regressive, apart from the very top.

Other analysis, including that from the Treasury, also shows the tax and benefit changes as being regressive between the bottom of the distribution and middle of the top half (up to the seventh or eighth tenth of the distribution). However, that analysis also suggests that the top tenth has lost more proportionately than the bottom tenth. The analysis in this paper suggests that there are three important dimensions for decisions to be made in how to make such comparisons that lead to this kind of conclusion.

The first is how large an income group is lumped together at the top when making this kind of comparison. Most of those within the top tenth are not in fact affected by what has happened to income tax for those with incomes above £100,000. But the incomes of those right at the top are so large, that what happens to them dominates the averages shown for the top tenth as a whole. So for instance, against a price-linked base, the next-to-top twentieth of the distribution are not losers on average.

The second is, however, a matter of interpretation – essentially over whether the income tax changes announced in Labour’s March 2009 Budget, which took effect from the start of April 2010, are counted as part of the system inherited in May 2010 or not. If the 2014/15 system is compared with the system in place in January 2010 (when the top rate of tax was 40 per cent) then our analysis also suggests that the top twentieth lost as much from direct tax and benefit changes as the bottom twentieth, around 3 per cent of income in each case. It depends, therefore whether the Coalition is given ‘credit’ for deciding not to reverse Labour’s changes that were already in effect when they took office. If it is, the overall regressivity of the reforms is reversed right at the top. If it is not, while the top twentieth lose slightly, their proportionate loss remains smaller than for all of the income groups in the bottom half of the population.

The third is the very many analytical choices that have to be made when considering the effects across the income distribution; as we illustrate in section 6, these can have a major effect on conclusions. One choice is how to rank households: a set of reforms that benefit low income households will look more progressive if households are ordered by income before the effect of policy changes, than if households are ranked by their post-reform incomes (as these same households will then be positioned higher up the income distribution, and their gains will appear to be a smaller proportion of their incomes). Whether or not all households entitled to benefits are assumed to receive them also has an influence, both because households not taking up benefits will naturally be located near the bottom of the distribution, and because changes to the generosity of payments that people do not receive cannot change household incomes. Allowing for non-take up therefore usually reduces the scale of changes – whether positive or negative – for low income groups, relative to an analysis that assumes complete take-up.

Finally, we look ahead at whether changes that have already been announced or planned, such as fully introducing Universal Credit and changes to indexation agreed by the government, if carried through to 2019/20, would change this picture (compared to an earnings-linked base, as being most appropriate for comparisons over the long term). Overall, we find that they would intensify the distributional effects seen by 2014/15. This would include increases in the losses of lone parent and large families, children in general and of most of the bottom half of the income distribution. Notably, looking over the whole period from May 2010 to 2019/20 people aged over 65 in general, and those aged over 80 in particular would lose. This is because they would be losing from much lower indexation rates for other benefits and parts of the tax system which would outweigh their gains from the ‘triple lock’ on state pensions. With losses both for pensioners and for children, some of the narrowing of age-related income differences achieved by the previous government would be reversed.

There is one potentially striking exception to this, however. While all other income groups in the bottom half would be losers on average over the nine years as a whole, the bottom twentieth would be gainers on average as a result of some of them receiving the new Universal Credit who would not currently be receiving all of the benefits and tax credits which it replaces. This effect is driven by the assumptions we make regarding take-up behaviour through the transition to UC: that take up of any of the existing means-tested payments will lead to take up of UC. This in turn reflects one of the main motivations for consolidating several claims and payments into one. It remains to be seen whether, in practice, take-up of means-tested pay ments improves in this way if UC is fully implemented.

Again, this illustrates the need to distinguish between broad conclusions and the subtleties of how particular groups are affected by complex combinations of reforms.

Overall, the changes have been regressive, with greater proportionate sacrifices from those with lower than those with higher incomes. But within this picture there are important variations, such as the less favourable treatment of some of those at the top, or the more favourable treatment of some of those at the very bottom if Universal Credit is introduced as planned and has the intended effect on take-up.

 

 

I did have a speed read through it and it's quite an interesting read   ...  ( I'm trying to work out if  Trent and Blandy  liked it because of the effort you went to to get it or if they didn't read it and liked it because they felt it proved me wrong and were showing Bicks their support )

 

however , a few key points , ( quoted to suit my argument of course ..see VT rule 103)

 

Indeed, it is striking that the overall fiscal effect of the changes after May 2010 up to 2014/15 compared to a price-linked base system was neutral overall

 

that analysis also suggests that the top tenth has lost more proportionately than the bottom tenth.

 

But within this picture there are important variations, such as the less favourable treatment of some of those at the top, or the more favourable treatment of some of those at the very bottom if Universal Credit is introduced as planned and has the intended effect on take-up.

 

the bottom twentieth would be gainers on average as a result of some of them receiving the new Universal Credit who would not currently be receiving all of the benefits and tax credits which it replaces

 

 

so a little from camp B and a little from camp H depending on how you interpret the data ...